Fwd: Brief update on post-Mullah Omar situation

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Begin forwarded message:

From: Andrea Pfanzelter
Date: August 11, 2015 at 00:02:19 GMT+2
To: Tede Rod-Larsen
Subject: Fwd: Brief update on post-Mullah Oniar situation

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

• From: Nasra Hassan
• Date: August 10, 2015 at 12:13:43 PM CDT
• To: Andrea Pfanzelter
• Cc: Michael Sarnitz
• Subject: Brief update on post-Mullah Omar situation

Just now sent to Max, Chris Elias, CC to SARnitz -- up to you whether you wish to do the high-level parallel TRL system, nasra

IPI Vienna

10 Aug 2015

Brief update on post-Nluilab Omar situation:

I. The hysteria and accusations & counter-accusations have toned down;

2. Mullah Mansur appears to be gaining ground. although the majority of the field commanders & shadow senior Taliban figures inside Afghanistan have not yet directly pronounced themselves;

3. The pin-Mullah Mansur voices outweigh the anti-Mullah Mansur voices - the former also can). far more weight (eg. pro-PEP Maulana Samiul Haq of Pakistan. who has been the teacher of the majority of the Afghan Taliban leaders at his madrassa. including Mullah Omar - even Prez Ghani has sent him an emissary to intervene): & almost all agree that in the past 5-6 years, i.e. well before Mullah Omar's death. Mullah Mansur has ably run Afghan Taliban affairs as well as the Quetta Shunt

4. A vital point is that there is no other senior figure who poses a serious challenge to Mullah Nfansur. both his deputies are respected figures. especially Sirajuddin Flagon':

Note: names of pro & contra leaders can be provided if required.

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5. While Mullah Taw% Agha Mutasim. head of the Political Office in Doha has resigned. he has been replaced by his deputy Sher Abbas Stanelczai - who has on his own behalf and that of the Doha set-up aceep(ed Mullah Mansur.

6. US drones arc active in both FATA and across the border in Afghanistan. targetingAfgha Taliban. TTP)Daesh & other militant gropups, includding the Ilaqqanis, US would like the Rounds to proceed & begin to yield results before Prez Obama's term ends - but are simultaneously miffed as to why ISI did not support "their" Doha process:

7. The most recent Afghan Taliban & Haqqani Group suicide attacks in Afghanistan arc being incorrectly ascribed to post-Mullah Omar power plays - in fact the Taliban have been most active since early 2015 (after the US & ISAF draw down)& arc spreading In non-traditional Taliban areas as well. eg. in northern Afghanistan;

R. Pak security forces & Mil Intel) are still in control of the process, despite the unexpected hitch; while they arc very wive in trying to get all their chickens in one coop and effect an early solution. they are not worried - their sanguine attitude is based on the above aspects, especially the point that there is no figure other than •their" Mullah Mansur who could conceivably draw even half ofhis votes! An interesting aside is that some ofthose who have voiced overt or muted objection to Mullah Mansur belong to the pro-talks group but wish to bypass ISI (a long history to this if inquired):

9. To soothe those whose main objection to Mullah Mansur was the small size of the group which nominated him successor. a large gathering ofclerics is expected to meet (& voice support for him) - right now all efforts arc geared to getting this large group safely in one place - no easy task, given the security situation as well as AAINonhan Alliance/NDS forces targeting groups which gather to pledge allegiance to Mullah Mansur!

10. No date yet fixed for Round 2 - but both Pak forces as well as the US are keen to stabilize Prez Ghani.

PEP: as stated in the last report, no direct effect except that the violence & insecurity affect PEP delivery in the field and the attention of the Kabul authorities is focused elsewhere.

Will update further as developments take place.

End.

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