Re: Today's discussion
Dear Stephen,
thank you for your so far unending patience in that discussion. --> =ttp://www.xkcd.com/386/
» I agree, and yet only a subset of animals can use symbols for =ommunication.
communication and intelligence are not the same thing (think about =ees etc)
» Of these, only a small subset can make use of negation, conjunctions =nd disjunctions in symbolic communication (for instance, Irene =epperberg's famous grey parrots). It appears that only humans can learn =ich grammatical language, and I suspect that this is the primary =nabler of our superior problem solving capabilities.
I disagree. Einstein claimed that his greatest discoveries came from =ental imagery, and he later converted those thoughts to verbal =xpressions only with great difficulty. I think AI has vastly =nderestimated the role of "mental simulation/emulation" in thinking and =easoning.
Nonverbal thinking is primary, and is poorly understood, and it has been =eglected by what we now often call "classic Al". (But if we look at the =riginal ideas, that was probably not intentional. Logic based systems =ere low hanging fruit. Once you have a paradigm and a community, you =nd up with a methodology that is bound to stay, unfortunately.)
But nonverbal thinking is something that I suspect is quite similarly =owerful in other primates. I think that the most interesting difference =etween chimps and humans is how we can use grammatical language to =program" and organize our thought processes, and how we can use it to =uggest, transmit, create and manipulate new categories.
I am on your side insofar as I think that the important research needs =o be done in mental imagery (or more accurately: on mental =epresentations and operations that facilitate mental imagery, among =ther things). But I think that human intelligence is shaped by the =dditions of grammars, which happen to be relatively easy to implement =hen you look at them in isolation. Only grammar on its own cannot do =hat Einstein did.
--[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[[ So.. what would be wrong with building a machine =hat could do well on IQ tests?
Nothing is wrong with building a machine that excels at playing chess =r cooking coffee or scoring that the Raven test.
The Raven would be a bad idea -- way too easy. The WAIS has some 11 =ubtests, which cover a wide range of underlying abilities (and are much =ore challenging)
Lets look at them (I have to admit that I am no expert on this, and it =s quite some time ago that I looked at IQ testing):
The processing speed tests are probably trivial for computers
The working memory tests are likewise rather simple engineering =roblems
Perceptual reasoning is somewhat similar to the Raven (maybe I =nderestimate them?)
Verbal comprehension:
similarities and vocabulary tests are classical Al and =omputational linguistics
information is close to IBM's Watson (recognition and =nference)
The only thing that looks interesting to me in the WAIS is the =omprehension test, because I don't see a straightforward approach to =heat on them with narrow Al. I would like to expand exactly this =omain: making sense of the world.
We don't have advanced problem solving ("these are the rules for chess. =ow would you try to beat a beginner level player, a medium player, a =op player most quickly?"). We don't have constructive abilities. We =on't have verbal creativity etc.
Please tell me if my take on the WAIS is wrong!
How do you know for sure what the "basics" are?
While the literal understanding of the Turing Test leads nowhere (or, =ell, to the Loebner prize), I think that he had the right idea. =ntelligence is reflected in the ability to participate in meaningful =iscourse, which includes interpreting and creatively structuring the =orld. Many of the things that the WAIS measures, like recognizing and =ategorizing shapes, are prerequisites for that. Others might be =cquired tastes that emerge on more basic functionality, like mental =rithmetic. But a toolbox is not an architecture. A collection of tubes, =ires, pedals and spokes is not a bicycle.
Some of the basics stem directly from the requirements of producing =dequate representations of perceptual and abstracted content (hybrid =ierarchical representations that can do associations, compositional =tuff, grammatical systematicity, learning and categorization, =nheritance etc.). Others come from the needs to get the processes of =ottom-up/top-down perception, reflection, memory retrieval, inference, =nalogy building etc. to work. And some have to do with the requirements =f translating between Mentalese (in Pinker's sense, not in Fodor's) and =atural language.
I may delude myself in thinking that I know what the basics are. In =act, it is extremely likely that I do (every computer science problem =eems to be misconceptualized until it has been properly implemented). =ut I would start with mental representation, perceptual processing and =otivational relevance, and then go for language, while revisiting those =reas that turn out to fall short.
Forget about the Raven; it's a non-verbal test of fluid intelligence =which in fact turns out to have, by accident not design, two different =ypes of items -- solved by spatial vs. analytic strategies). The Raven =oes not even begin to characterize all of what is captured by the WAIS
It might well be that I totally misunderestimate the WAIS requirements; = will look at them.
» I agree. But I am not convinced that proper emotions are absolutely =ecessary for Intelligence (motivation might suffice to drive some kind =f non-emotional, serene Buddha intelligence). I am nevertheless =nterested in understanding and modeling them.
I think Antonio Damasio and his successors have made a very good case =hat emotion plays a key role in reasoning. (Not just motivation, actual =motion.)
Most of what I would say against that has been better expressed by Aaron =loman. For instance, if my computer is prone to swapping memory content =o hard drive and back, and I kill the part of the OS that coordinates =he swapping, my computer is likely to malfunction. But from this I =annot infer that computers cannot work without swapping. 0amasio's argument does not convince me because he does not elucidate a =unctional role that would emotion an absolute requirement for an =rtificial mind. Lesion studies amount to shutting down parts of an =perating system that has been designed to cope with very specific =equirements. I believe that in humans, emotions structure social =nteraction, support communication, prime memory and cognitive =rocessing, and most importantly, allocate the scarce resources of our =ind according to the current situation. None of this is necessary if I =emove the resource constraints.
But again, perhaps there are better arguments now than in the original =omatic marker hypothesis?
Please do not misunderstand me; I am making a merely philosophical point =ere, with respect to the basic requirements for Intelligence. I think =hat emotion is highly interesting, that Damasio is quite correct with =espect to what emotion does, and that it makes a lot of sense (and is =un) to equip Ms with emotion, mood, affect and emotional dispositions. =ut strictly necessary? No.
Are you involved in BICA? That seems like a natural community for you!
The way I understand it, there are at least four very similar groups =ow: cognitive modeling (that is where John Anderson goes), AGI (started =y Ben Goertzel as an attempt to revive the original Al), BICA (a =emnant from the failed DARPA proposal of the same name, and later sicked up by Alexei Samsonovich as an alternative to AGI, I suspect =ecause he does not get along with Ben), and Cognitive Systems (Pat =angley et al.). I basically like them all, and think that they should =oin forces, while simultaneously raising the bars against narrow AI and =cience fiction. Many members of the audience already belong to two or =ven three of the groups. Alas, politics, mutual accusations of =cruffiness and stuffiness, and so on...
Personally, I have not been to one of the BICA conferences (only a =ouple planning workshops), and I am on their roster of reviewers.
Cheers,
Joscha