Fw: Situation in the Middle East - FINAL
The centre of gravity in the region is currently the Syrian crisis. Beyond the civil war there is a regional war in a global context being fought on Syrian territory. In addition to the tragic and ongoing humanitarian crisis with now probably more than forty thousand dead and millions of refugees and displaced, a new Great Game of geostrategic importance is being played out.
On the one side there is a regional axis of allies going from Teheran through Baghdad to Damascus and to Hezbollah in Lebanon, with the diplomatic protection of Moscow and Beijing. On the other side there is a block of countries in full political and military confrontation with the axis, running from Turkey through Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Jordan and to France, United Kingdom and the United States. Both The Block and the Axis are providing financial resources and weaponry to respectively the rebels and the regime. Hezbollah has fighters on the ground and there are daily shipments of weapons and ammunition to the regime from Teheran through Baghdad. On the other side weapons and money are flowing to different rebel groups across the borders from Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. A double chess game is being played; on the table and under the table. On the table western powers, Russia, China, Iran and the UN are calling for a diplomatic and political solution, spearheaded by UN envoy Brahimi. Under the table a vicious military escalation is being conducted by both sides with close intelligence cooperation at the highest level through the services of the Block. The calls of the UN Security Council to demilitarise the conflict stands in stark and inconsistent contrast to the actions of the same parties on the ground. Though the three key western powers are not providing lethal hardware, they are fully privy to the shipments of such equipment from their allies.
On the ground the situation is complicated by any standard. The Free Syrian Army is a loose coalition of fighters with a broad spectrum of colours and stripes: from Al Qaida affiliated groups to liberal secularists, united only by one common goal: the fall of the House of Assad.
All actors, internationally, regionally and locally, seem to agree that the end of the regime is inevitable. Some think Bashar Al Assad can prolong his regime way into 2013. Others think he will fall within weeks, pointing to the fact that rebel forces are inching forward in a ring inside the capital.
For Assad there seems to be in principle three options: leave into exile; fight to the last stand; or being pushed aside in a coup d'etat. The first is not a viable option: the Alawite elite would never let him leave, abandoning them. A coup is a remote possibility: the rebels would not accept any alternative regime figure as a counterpart in negotiations for a peaceful settlement.
The most likely scenario is that the regime will fight to the bitter end, to the last bullet and drop of blood.
This leads to two questions: when Assad realises that he will fall, will he then try to drag with him as many enemies as he can? And: what will a post-Assad Syria look like?
An acute worry has risen from reliable intelligence reports that he has armed up to forty warheads of Scud missiles with a variety of chemical weapons. The question is whether he is seriously contemplating using them as a last resort against his own people or launching them against his enemies in neighbouring countries. His repeated utterings of "putting the region into flames from the Mediterranean to the Caspian" if he is touched does not to many ring as hollow as before. This could have possible detrimental consequences to Kazakhstan's oil and gas interests in the Caspian.
The opposition and the rebels are so diverse and split that a likely scenario for the post-Assad era with high likelihood will produce a second civil war. The geostrategic importance of Syria can not be underestimated. The loss of Syria for Iran will constitute a major blow to its aspirations of becoming a hegemonic regional power, and it will fight for new allies in Syria to keep its grip on the country. The west and the Gulf countries will have to do the same for their allies. The fact that different countries of the Block are backing different groups are also complicating matters for a post regime situation.
In conclusion: Syria will for years to come be unruly and a centre for the geostrategic struggle of the region.
Above all this looms Iran's ambition to be the regional hegemon. Its nuclear ambitions underpin the worries of the west, Israel and the Gulf states. In the current Israeli leadership there is a strong belief that Iran is hell-bent on acquiring a nuclear capacity, and that negotiations are only theatrics playing to the gallery. The Israeli leadership believes they have the military capacity to strike effectively, and are countering objections that it will only delay the program by pointing to the fact that both Iraq and Syria abandoned their programs after Israeli strikes.
However the composition of the Israeli cabinet after January election might change the outlook on these matters. The role of Zipi Livni, Lieberman (who is fighting an indictment), and Ehud Barak (who is not running for the Knesset, but might be asked by the PM to fill a prominent position related to both the Iranian and Palestinian issues) will be critical.
Vis a vis Iran some are of the opinion that the president would be willing to strike the Iranian facilities if negotiations fail. However the question of who will fill the posts of State and Defence might influence such a decision. Both front runners for these positions are considered dovish on the issue.
In the broader context of the region, unpredictability is the order of the day. Tunisia and Egypt seems to be roughly split in two with regimes leaning to conservative Islam on one side and moderate, secular and liberals on the other. In Egypt, whose geostrategic importance is undisputed, the new constitution gives worrying signals of new authoritarianism which will give new impetus to solidify and unify the opposition.
Yemen is equally unpredictable. Jordan and Kuwait are shaky and face uncertainty. Bahrain seems slowly to cope adequately with its issues. Lebanon is shaking under the spill-over of the conflict in Syria, brought to a peak through the assassination of its intelligence chief as well as street battles in Tripoli. The Palestinian issue will be frozen until after Israeli elections and the formation of a new cabinet, although the Europeans, and predominantly France, are working on new initiatives to be launched after the elections.
In Saudi Arabia two younger and forceful figures have taken the reigns of both the intelligence agency and the powerful Ministry of the Interior. The country is again playing a major role in the region, particularly in the Syrian theatre. However the succession issue will be of paramount importance for the long term of the country.
Overall conclusion in a nutshell: uncertainty is the only certainty for the region. And importantly: these are the only conflicts on the planet which are not only of a local and regional character - they have serious implications for global security. A major new war in the Middle East will shake the very financial and political foundation of world order.
Original Message
From: Walter Kemp
To: Terje Rod-Larsen
Cc: Andrea Pfanzelter
Sent: Thu Dec 2014:27:12 2012
=ubject: FW: Situation in the Middle East - FINAL
The centre of gravity in the region is currently the Syrian crisis. Beyond =he civil war there is a regional war in a global context being fought on S=rian territory. In addition to the tragic and ongoing humanitarian crisis =ith now proably more than forty thousand dead and millions of refugees and=displaced, a new Great Game of geostrategic importance is being played out=
On the one side there is a regional axis of allies going from Teheran throu=h Baghdad to Damascus and to Hezbollah in Lebanon, with the diplomatic pro=ection of Moscow and Beijing. On the other side there is a block of count=ies in full political and military confrontation with the axis, running fr=m Turkey through Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Jordan and to =rance, United Kingdom and the United States. Both The Block and the Axis a=e providing financial resources and weaponry to respectively the rebels an= the regime. Hezbollah has fighters on the ground and there are daily shiprents of weapons and ammunition to the regime from Teheran through Baghdad.=On the other side weapons and money are flowing to different rebel groups =cross the borders from Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. A double chess game is =eing played; on the table and under the table. On the table western powers= Russia, China, Iran and the UN are calling for a diplomatic and political=solution, spearheaded by UN envoy Brahimi. Under the table a vicious milit=ry escalation is being conducted by both sides with close intelligence co-=peration at the highest level through the services of the Block. The calls=of the UN Security Council to demilitarise the conflict stands in stark an= inconsistent contrast to the actions of the same parties on the ground. T=ough the three key western powers are not providing lethal hardware, they =re fully privy to the shipments of such equipment from their allies.
On the ground the situation is complicated by any standard. The Free Syrian=Army is a loose coalition of fighters with a broad spectrum of colours and=stripes: from Al Qaida affiliated groups to liberal secularists, united on=y by one common goal: the fall of the House of Assad.
All actors, internationally, regionally and locally, seem to agree that the=end of the regime is inevitable. Some think Bashar Al Assad can prolong hi= regime way into 2013. Others think he will fall within weeks, pointing to=the fact that rebel forces are inching forward in a ring inside the capita=.
For Assad there seems to be in principle three options: leave into exile; fright to the last stand; or being pushed aside in a coup d'etat. The first i= not a viable option: the Alawite elite would never let him leave, abandon=ng them. A coup is a remote possibility: the rebels would not accept any a=ternative regime figure as a counterpart in negotiations for a peaceful se=tlement.
The most likely scenario is that the regime will fight to the bitter end, t= the last bullet and drop of blood.
This leads to two questions: when Assad realises that he will fall, will he=then try to drag with him as many enemies as he can? And: what will a post=Assad Syria look like?
An acute worry has risen from reliable intelligence reports that he has arm=d up to forty warheads of Scud missiles with a variety of chemical weapons= The question is whether he is seriously contemplating using them as a las= resort against his own people or launching them against his enemies in ne=ghbouring countries. His repeated utterings of "putting the region into fl=mes from the Mediterranean to the Caspian" if he is touched does not to ma=y ring as hollow as before. This could have possible detrimental consequen=es to Kazakhstan's oil and gas interests in the Caspian.
The opposition and the rebels are so diverse and split that a likely scenar=o for the post-Assad era with high likelihood will produce a second civil =ar. The geostratigic importance of Syria can not be underestimated. The lo=s of Syria for Iran will consitute a major blow to it's aspirations of bec=ming a hegemonic regional power, and it will fight for new allies in Syria=to keep it's grip on the country. The west and the Gulf countries will hav= to do the same for their allies. The fact that different countries of the=Block are backing different groups are also complicating matters for a pos= regime situation.
In conclusion: Syria will for years to come be unruly and a centre for the =eostratigic struggle of the region.
Above all this looms Iran's ambition to be the regional hegemon. It's nucle=r ambitions underpin the worries of the west, Israel and the Gulf states. =n the current Israeli leadership there is a strong belief that Iran is hel=-bent on acquiring a nuclear capacity, and that negotiations are only thea=rics playing to the gallery. The Israeli leadership believes they have the=military capacity to strike effectively, and are countering objections tha= it will only delay the program by pointing to the fact that both Iraq and=Syria abandoned their programs after Israeli strikes.
However the composition of the Israeli cabinet after January election might=change the outlook on these matters. The role of Zipi Livni, Lieberman (w=o is fighting an indictment), and Ehud Barak (who is not running for the K=esset, but might be asked by the PM to fill a prominent position related t= both the Iranian and Palestinian issues) will be critical.
Vis a vis Iran some are of the opinion that the president would be willing =o strike the Iranian facilities if negotiations fail. However the question=of who will fill the posts of State and Defence might influence such a dec=sion. Both front runners for these positions are considered dovish on the =ssue.
In the broader context of the region, unpredictability is the order of the =ay. Tunisia and Egypt seems to be roughly split in two with regimes leanin= to conservative Islam on one side and moderate, secular and liberals on t=e other. In Egypt, who's geostratigic importance is undisputed, the new co=stitution gives worrying signals of new authoritarianism which will give n=w impetus to solidify and unify the opposition.
Yemen is equally unpredictable. Jordan and Kuwait are shaky and face uncert=inty. Bahrain seems slowly to cope adequately with its issues. Lebanon is =haking under the spill-over of the conflict in Syria, brought to a peak th=ough the assassination of its intelligence chief as well as street battles=in Tripoli. The Palestinian issue will be frozen until after Israeli elect=ons and the formation of a new cabinet, although the Europeans, and predom=nantly France, are working on new initiatives to be launched after the ele=tions.
In Saudi Arabia two younger and forceful figures have taken the reigns of b=th the intelligence agency and the powerful Ministry of the Interior. The =ountry is again playing a major role in the region, particularly in the Sy=ian theatre. However the succession issue will be of paramount importance =or the long term of the country.
Overall conclusion in a nutshell: uncertainty is the only certainty for the=region. And importantly: these are the only conflicts on the planet which =re not only of a local and regional character - they have serious implicat=ons for global security. A major new war in the Middle East will shake the=very financial and political foundation of world order.