August 26 update

26 August, 2013

Articl= 1.

The Daily Beast

Obama's New Syria Options=/u>

Leslie H. Gelb http://www.thedailybeast.com/contributors=leslie-h-gelb.html

Article 2.

The Wall Street Journal

Syria's Gas Attack on Civilization

Andrew Roberts

Articl= 3.

The Washington Post

Syria will require more than cruis= missiles

Eliot A. Cohen

Article 4.

The Wall Street Journal

The Failed Grand Strategy in the M=ddle East

Walter Russell Mead

Articl= 5.

NYT

Adrift on the Nile<=p>

Bill Keller http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/t=mestopics/people/k/bill_keller/index.html

Article 6.

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The National Interest

Arab Spring or Islamic Spring?

Ross Harrison http://nationalinterest.org/profile/ross-=arrison

Article 7.

The New York Times

Reading Tweets from Iran

Editorial

Article 1.

The Daily Beast

Obama's New=Syria Options

les=ie H. Gelb http://www.thedailybeast.com/contributors=leslie-h-gelb.html

Aug 25, 2013-- After the most recent use of chemical weapons in Syria=/span> http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/08/21/new-chem=cal-weapons-attack-could-kill-obama-s-syria-strategy.html , President Obama is sheltering his next moves even from his closest adviser= as the whole Obama administration inches painfully toward what they all s=e as the moment of truth in Syria.

Once again, he could walk away from the use of force because that o=tion has little backing either in his administration or among Americans ge=erally. But after an endless run of inter-agency meetings at the White House, the sense is that he is nearing three conclus=ons: first, the Syrian government has put his credibility on the line irre=ocably and inescapably; second, he now must take direct military action to=punish the government of President Bashar al-Assad, though not in a manner that commits him to further use of=force; and third, he needs to combine whatever force he uses now with dram=tic and diplomatic initiatives.

Officials expect White House decis=ons to come quickly at this point. Most officials openly lament how they a=e being whipsawed between a general consensus in the administration against employing U.S. military force backed by huge=opposition to doing so (60 percent) among polled Americans, and a growing =nd potent consensus among foreign policy experts and politicians to give A=sad a hard punch.

Most administration officials and most Americans just can't see a=y lasting benefits from any form of direct U.S. military involvement in Sy=ia, and they fear that initial actions would lead only to more and more force. On the other hand, policy experts =nd politicians are arguing with increasing vigor that America's and Obam='s credibility in the Middle East and in the world are on the line, that=he has drawn so many red lines http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/05/05/obama-s-=yrian-red-line-could-return-us-to-the-mistakes-of-iraq.html against Assad's use of chemicals that neither he nor the U.S. can afford further thumb-suc=ing. This

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credibility argument is deeply reinforced by a humanitarian one.=The refugee http://www.thedailybeast.com/witw/articles/2013/08/23/syr=an-refugee-crisis-reaches-one-million-children.html and death tolls http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/08/27/syrian-u=rising-body-count-spikes-as-assad-forces-massacre-civilians.html are already sky high and leaping daily and now require more than mere rhetoric and emergen=y aid.

With these pressures and considerations in mind, here are the overl=pping policy choices the Obama team has looked at over the last week:

1. Wait on the reports of U.N. inspectors, now apparently heading t=ward the site where chemical weapons were, in all probability, fired off. =he expectation is the inspectors will find that such weapons were, in fact, employed. Few expect the inspectors =an come to a definitive conclusion on whether the government or the rebels=fired them. But the presumption is bound to be that the weapons belong to =he government and that the government was responsible. As quickly as possible, take the matter to the U.N. Secur=ty Council, but anticipate a Russian and Chinese veto of military action. =aking these steps is more or less a given for Obama to satisfy his impulse= to bow to international law.

2. Meantime, go to friendly Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia and t=e Gulf Emirates, plus key European allies such as Britain and France and s=e if they will join a military coalition as they did in Libya http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/04/03/nicolas-=arkozy-s-war-on-gaddafi-influenced-by-philosopher-bernard-henri-levy.html . This wouldn't provide full international or legal cover, but it would he=p. U.S. officials don't expect much support from Arab states, but hope f=r some from Paris and London. All this is to ensure the U.S. doesn't hav= to act alone.

3. Provide more and better military =rms to the rebels, and this time actually expedite the equipment. Mo=t administration officials still don't like this option. They remain unconvinced that they know enough about the rebel= to http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/06/15/will-arm=ng-syrian-rebels-lead-to-disaster.html make sure the aid doesn't fall into the . wrong hands

4. Attack Syrian government military targets with cruise missiles, =rones or with the foregoing plus piloted U.S. aircraft. The number of atta=ks would be limited. The U.S. military still doesn't care for this option any more than it likes the idea of ar=ing the rebels. They don't see its having much effect on either Syrian c=pability or morale. They worry that it will produce only demands for more =ombing.

5. Go further than air attacks and establish no fly zones over part= of Syria. These zones would border Turkey and Jordan, and perhaps Iraq, w=th the intent of protecting refugees and hitting Syrian fighters when and where possible. Some Congressional ha=ks love this option, but in the view of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, it=would be very difficult to establish and conduct. The logistical problems =re enormous and at least Turkey and Jordan would have to participate, an unlikely prospect.

6. Try to use the horror and political pressures of the latest che=ical weapons attack to launch a new diplomatic negotiating initiative, per=aps focused on a cease-fire. To have any chance of success, this would require two things: first, genuine help =rom Russia to pressure the Assad government for compromises; and second, a=U.S. willingness to make a deal with the Assad government plus some, but n=t all, of the rebels. No official is holding his breath on this one, but they all think it's worth marryin= to any direct U.S. military force. The one concern is that diplomatic fai=ure would serve to ramp up pressures for further military action. Besides,=there's great uncertainty about how Assad will react to U.S. intervention, i.e., with more defiance or a willi=gness to talk.

7. Offer a significantly upgraded aid package for refugees in Turk=y, Jordan, and Lebanon, and a new and dramatic proposal for humanitarian a=d to all needy Syrians inside Syria. Of course, the latter would require agreement and participation by Damascu=. It might also be a good way to lay the groundwork for future negotiation=.