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HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028234

House Oversight Committee
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challenges Israel would face during Clinton’s final period in office and afterwards, I knew I could not go further without seeking a fresh mandate from the country, however unlikely the prospects now seemed.

Deciding to do so was a decision that was probably easier for me than for other politicians. Privileged though I felt as Prime Minister to be able to pursue what I felt deeply were Israel’s national interests, the trappings of office were not that important to me. I’d gone into politics to do things, not for the photo opportunities. I did still believe it was important to see the final diplomatic push by Clinton through to its end. But I knew an early election for Prime Minister wouldn’t happen overnight. It would involve a couple of months’ preparation.

When I called a news conference on December 9, the media, and the country, assumed that it was about the Palestinian violence and the ups and downs of the Clinton initiative, and I did talk about both. But at the end, I said: “There are those who doubt the mandate I recetved from the citizens of Israel. I have decided to seek a new mandate — to lead the state of Israel on the road to peace, security and a proper civic and social agenda.” I said I would go see the Israeli President the following morning. “I will formally resign, and run for a special election, at the head of the Labor Party, for the Prime Ministership of Israel.”

The election was set for February 2001. The last act in President Clinton’s attempt at a breakthrough actually came after the American election, and just a month before George W. Bush would succeed him. Since, in practical terms, any final agreement would almost certainly come under President Bush, Clinton’s final negotiating paper was framed as a set of paramaters which, if agreed to by both sides, were intended to set the stage for a final deal. On December 23, Clinton presented the draft to both sides’ representatives at the White House. I wasn’t there. But the accounts I got from Shlomo, Gili and Dennis Ross afterwards made me feel as if I was. The president said he would read through the document and then leave the Israeli and Palestinian teams with Dennis to make sure they’d recorded each detail. He said this was no longer the starting point for further argument on the basic shape of a peace deal. This was his considered judgement of

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