Despite Rabin’s quip about ex-generals and Prime Ministers, I was surprised when, a couple of days later, he asked me to come see him. He smiled as I entered his office. Then he said: “Ehud, now that you are out of uniform. I would be glad to see you come into politics, together with us, and be a member of the government.” He said he’d discussed it with Peres. “It’s a joint invitation.” Though I did, of course, say yes, I also told him I was planning to take some time off, probably at first with a think tank in the US. Though I wasn’t exactly sure about the legal provisions for officers leaving the army, I reminded him that there was a set period of time during which they could not enter politics. He replied, a bit enigmatically, that he would be sending an “operative” to talk to me further about the timing.
The operative was Giora Einy, a uniquely important figure in Labor because he was trusted both by Rabin and Peres. I liked him immediately. Throughout my years in politics, | would come to rely on him for his experience, good humor and good judgement. He did know about the rules for former army people going into politics: there was a 100-day moratorium. “Rabin wants you immediately,” he said. “I guess we’ll tell him that ‘immediately’ will have to mean sometime in April.” In fact, I told Giora that I’d hoped it would be much longer. So we agreed that in order to give me at least a few months in the US, he’d tell Rabin he could get in touch at any time from March 1996 with his invitation to join the cabinet. As soon as he did so, I would formally cut my ties with the military, meaning I could join the government in the summer.
Nava, the girls and I left for Washington in January. I joined the Center for Strategic and International Studies and was given the delightfully overwrought title of Distinguished Visiting Statesman and Senior Associate. The reason the CSIS had invited me was to write and speak on the Middle East. About two months in, I presented a paper. I began by welcoming the constellation of changes which seemed to offer at least an opportunity for stability, security and peace: the unravelling of the Soviet Union; the Oslo Agreement; the peace treaty with Jordan and the continuing talks with the Syrians. As long as we had partners committed to reaching an agreement, I believed Israel would be ready “to consider major compromise and to take upon ourselves significant calculated risks.” But with a frankness which seems surprising even to me in retrospect, I delivered much the same message as I had to ministers on the potential dangers inherent in the Oslo process as we moved forward.
I pointed out that Arafat had made no move to rein in groups like Hamas, and that more Israelis had actually been killed by terror since Oslo than in the
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