Syria was always going to be harder. But Rabin had moved past his anger over the “pocket deposit”, and we began a new effort via the Americans. Our aim was to lay out a comprehensive, staged proposal to trade nearly the entire Golan for peace. With Rabin, Itamar Rabinovich and the rest of the team, we put together a framework limiting Syria’s military presence on the Heights. We envisaged phasing out the restrictions as Syria took steps toward the kind of peace which had proved possible with Egypt and Jordan. But indirect exchanges in the autumn of 1994 produced little progress. In December, Rabin proposed to the Americans that I meet with a Syrian representative, and President Assad agreed. Later that month, I was sent to Washington for talks with Syria’s ambassador, Walid Muallem. With the Americans’ Mideast envoy, Dennis Ross, as host, we met in Blair House across the street from the White House.
I began by explaining the security provisions we envisaged for the Golan, which included early-warning provisions, force limitations and other means of safeguarding Israel against any surprise attack. Muallem’s response was formulaic, almost icy, with no indication he was ready to discuss any of the specifics, much less offer ideas of his own. But then Dennis led us out into the garden, where the atmosphere, if sadly not the weather, was a bit warmer. I told Ambassador Muallem I believed Israel’s issues with Syria ought to be resolvable. Both sides understood the broad terms of an eventual peace. But we needed a context of trust in which to negotiate. President Assad, and we as well, were always going to be reluctant formally to commit ourselves to a position until each side was be satisfied that the other side understood its core needs. Politically, both sides also faced constraints. “In formal meetings, a record is taken and negotiators have to explain and justify every last word back home,” I said. “I think our negotiators can get further in conversations like the one we’re having now.” Though Muallem nodded agreement, he did not explicitly say he believed that informal exchanges were the way forward. Still, he did obviously pass back a broadly positive message to Damascus. Before the Blair House discussion, our understanding had been there would probably be a kind of mirror arrangement for a follow-up meeting: between our ambassador in Washington, Itamar Rabinovich, and a high-ranking army officer from the Syrian side. Instead, we received word that Assad wanted me to meet directly with General Himat Shihabi, who was not only my counterpart as Syrian chief- of-staff but Assad’s oldest and closest political ally and the effective number- two man in the régime.
General Shihabi and I met over a period of two days at Blair House. He had greater authority, and thus a greater sense of self-assurance, than the
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