arrow_back Search

HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_021305

House Oversight Committee
insert_drive_file IMAGES-006-HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_021305.txt description DOCUMENT text_fields 531 words · 3.3k chars

a shared social goal. Sometimes the goal is spontaneous as in clapping to demonstrate appreciation and sometimes the goal is imposed by the situation (e.g., musicians following a musical score and instructions of a conductor, soldiers marching to the call of a drill sergeant). However, when we behave in synchrony with others, there is a sense of becoming part of something larger than ourselves.

To the people engaged in spontaneously synchronized behavior, there is a clearly identifiable and seemingly individual ‘cause’ for their emergent behavior. But when a group shares the same goal—demonstrating approval—and engages in the same action—clapping—the stage is set for such behavior to become coordinated and organized even without an external agent (conductor or drill sergeant). How do those moments of spontaneous social aggregation occur? How does the social brain work to join with others to form the emergent group?

We have begun to understand the underlying dynamics of how and when such phenomena are likely to occur and even how such phenomena can be potentially engineered. New insights afforded by developments in social psychology, developmental psychology, and social neuroscience have suggested the way in which our brains respond to the invisible force of social connection. These scientific developments suggest neural mechanisms that may be important to the way we interact with others. At the same time, the insights also reveal the likely conditions under which individual self merges into the group. Such situations when the sense of self is suspended contrast sharply with the modern Western notion of the individual standing apart from others. Indeed, the traditional Western focus on

Page |59

individual-centered reasons, motives, intentions, and causes may be at odds with some forms of spontaneously synchronized behaviors and group action.

Towards a Biology of Social Interaction

Consider the perspective of an engaged spectator at a singles tennis match. Although we may be sitting distant from competitors, if we identify with one of the players we are not merely passive observers. On the contrary, our observation of the events in the game can serve to activate some of the same neural mechanisms that would be active if we were playing the game rather than just observing it. We can feel the moves, feel the impetus to defend an attack, and feel the urge to slam the ball as if we ourselves are playing, albeit without actually flailing our arms around. We may even anticipate a move by the opponent and imagine ourselves making the potential response. Research over the last 10 years or so has revealed that our brains can map the movements of other human beings onto our own bodies almost as if we were making those movements’. This ability to put ourselves in another person’s shoes makes it possible to identify with either player.

By comparison to the audience, consider how this ability can serve us as one of the players. This capacity provides an important facility for anticipating our opponent’s moves allowing us to plan a response even before the opponent has completed a groundstroke. This kind of anticipation does not depend on explicit reasoning or conscious reflection—it seems to operate as an automatic mechanism **. This kind of mechanism may facilitate

HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_021305