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a delegation from Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)—but again there were no discernible consequences. In a separate case, a senior Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs official warned that a particular interactive website focusing on Chinese security issues was “anti-China.” In response, the think tank invited contributions by a prominent Chinese think-tank scholar: “The content of the website didn’t change, but the official didn’t complain again.” In another instance, the Chinese government withdrew an offer to a US think tank to host Foreign Minister Wang Yi after that think tank refused to disinvite a Taiwanese speaker for a separate event.
Chinese officials have also requested that US think tanks bar certain scholars or NGO activists from participating in discussions with senior Chinese officials. When Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi spoke at one high-profile Washington think tank, the embassy requested the guest list in advance and then demanded that several individuals—including at least one senior China scholar—be disinvited. The think tank refused. In yet another case involving the director of the National People’s Congress Foreign Affairs Committee, Fu Ying, a US think tank was strongly advised to exclude a well-known China specialist as a condition for a meeting going forward. Think-tank analysts report that in most cases, but not all, such requests have been rejected and events continue as planned.
Generally speaking, PRC visitors either steer clear of or limit their contact with think tanks that have strong relations with, or extensive funding from, Taiwan. One analyst who writes extensively on Taiwan and PRC-Taiwan relations finds that Chinese officials typically do not engage with him. At one time, there was a conflict between an event that he was hosting for a Taiwanese official with a significant event that same afternoon hosted by a colleague that featured very prominent Chinese and American officials. The Chinese embassy instructed them to move the Taiwan event, but they refused. Both events took place with no apparent negative repercussions.
Think Tank to Think Tank
As noted above, Chinese officials and think-tank counterparts reach out to American think-tank China specialists for the purposes of information/intelligence collection and influencing US policy debates. One Chinese scholar reported to an American think-tank analyst that that every time an American expert meets with a Chinese interlocutor, a report is written afterward. Another Chinese visitor indicated to
a leading Washington think-tank expert that China’s Foreign Ministry has staff dedicated to tracking the activities and publications of about twenty leading American-China specialists.
Any number of Chinese think tanks sponsor meetings and conferences in China and the United States with American counterparts. In some instances, the Chinese
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