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recognized China experts (with the exception of one who is more broadly an Asia expert but has extensive experience with China-related projects) who have served as directors of programs or centers in their respective institutions. About half have served in the US government. One directs a think tank that is partially supported by Chinese government funds. The interviews were all conducted in 2018.
China has become a priority field for US think tanks concerned with international relations, and most now have staff members (often several) devoted to researching and publishing on China. Many possess PhD degrees, Chinese language skills, and have lived in or visited China over many years with some originally from the PRC. Some stay on staff for many years, while others work on short-term (two- or three-year) contracts. Most think tanks also employ student research assistants and interns (including those from China).
There is significant interaction between American and Chinese think tanks—as think-tank researchers need to visit China as well as host and receive visitors in the United States to be well informed and to perform their own research work. Most interviewees reported hosting or participating in ad hoc meetings in their home institutions with visiting Chinese officials or scholars on a regular basis; although two do not host any meetings with Chinese, they will attend such events if hosted by others. All but one
of the interviewees travel to China for their work: to deliver lectures, to participate in conferences or Track 1.5 or Track 2 dialogues, and to do research for articles, books, and reports.
A number of scholars noted a marked shift in the nature of their interactions with Chinese colleagues and research projects over the past few years. While long- standing Track 2 dialogues continue on issues such as cyber policy, nuclear policy,
and US-China interactions in third countries and regions, overall they seem not as open, robust, and productive as in the past. Indeed, several long-standing Track 2 dialogues have been curtailed or stopped altogether—with scholars reporting that
it is increasingly difficult to establish sustained dialogues that are meaningful with Chinese think tanks because of new rules, restrictions, and uncertainties. For instance, Chinese institutions (both think tanks and universities) must now obtain central-level government approval, such as vetting dialogue topics and foreign participants, before being able to host foreign participants in China. New Chinese government regulations generally limit Chinese think-tank scholars and university professors to one foreign trip per year, and even go so far as to hold passports to make even personal travel more difficult.
When dialogues do occur, another noticeable recent trend has been a decline in candor and greater uniformity in what Chinese interlocutors say. One US think tanker noted, “The conversations have declined in productivity,” while another commented
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