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HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020511

House Oversight Committee
insert_drive_file IMAGES-006-HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020511.txt description DOCUMENT text_fields 454 words · 3.2k chars

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Promote Integrity

BeAlert to Risks The primary risk is of inappropriate influence over admissions, course content, and program activities stemming from the influence of Chinese government-linked donors, diplomatic missions, student groups, and institutions. This is not a new challenge for US university administrators and development officers. They have dealt with political quid pro quos from donors from South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Israel, Russia, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and other countries in the past and currently, and American universities have long learned how to refuse donations with strings attached. This historical experience and the existing safeguards should also help inform and guide US universities when it comes to dealing with this new wave of Chinese money. Faculty and administrators must continue to protect the open debate, diversity of opinion, freedom of expression, faculty autonomy, and transparency on which the health and reputation of their institutions are based. Funding from Chinese sources should be as welcome as funding from other sources, but only to the extent that fundamental academic values can be maintained and protected.

A second risk is a loss of sensitive or proprietary technology through academic instruction of cooperation. There are indications that the US government is now strengthening measures to protect the theft of sensitive technology and intellectual property that is being developed on US campuses. These measures may require heightened screening and, in some cases, outright denial of visas to individuals from certain state-run institutions or even from certain sensitive research fields. Such

calls have understandably prompted concern from the academic community fearing that this will undermine the principles of academic freedom, hinder collaboration, and deny American universities access to a rich talent pool. These reservations are merited and require that any tightening of visa categories be as narrow as possible. For their part, universities will of course have to comply with whatever regulations are imposed. They should, additionally, proactively review and update their procedures for protecting both proprietary and classified research. They should also enter into far closer collegial discussions with one another, relevant professional associations, and government agencies to collectively refine solutions to the difficult problem of balancing the pursuit of innovation and academic freedom with preventing the theft of technology and other IP.

To meet these challenges, American universities may need to update their rules and intensify faculty and researcher training and institutional oversight for protection of proprietary research information. Some US universities refuse to accept contracts for classified research. Those that do accept such contracts must comply with government regulations for the protection of research findings. But all research universities conduct research that produces valuable intellectual property, which is proprietary

in various proportions to the funder. And so, it is necessary for the university and

Universities

HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020511