The Question of When | 167
in a position to know Snowden’s contribution. “Let’s be frank,” he said in a taped interview with NPR (in Russian), “Snowden did share intelligence. This is what security services do. If there’s a possibility to get information, they will get it.”
Even without Klintsevich’s comments, top American intelligence officers had little doubt that the Russian security services would do their job. Michael Hayden, for example, who in succession headed three American intelligence services, was certainly in a position to appreciate the capabilities of the Russian and Chinese intelligence services. He told me in 2014 that he saw no other possibility than that Snowden would be induced to cooperate in this situation, say- ing, “I would lose all respect for the Russian and Chinese security services if they haven’t fully exploited everything Snowden had to give.” They certainly had that opportunity when Snowden spent almost six weeks at Sheremetyevo International Airport. The FSB controlled his access to food, lodgings, the Internet, and whatever else he needed to survive there. If he did not cooperate, the FSB could also return him to the United States, where in the eyes of the
© Department of Justice he had betrayed the United States by stealing ® secrets and taking them abroad. What recourse did Snowden have? In a word, the FSB held all the cards but one—Snowden’s help with the stolen documents. Even if Snowden disliked the tactics of the Russian security services, he now had a powerful inducement not to decline the requests of the Russian authorities.
Two weeks after his arrival, the Russian authorities provided him with a convenient path to full cooperation with Russia. He was put in contact with Anatoly Grigorievich Kucherena, a silver-haired, fifty-two-year-old lawyer who is known to be a personal friend of Putin’s. Kucherena did tasks for Putin’s party in the Russian parlia- ment, or Duma. He had excellent connections in the Russian secu- rity apparatus because he served on the oversight committee of the FSB. Kucherena offered to serve as Snowden’s pro bono lawyer. On July 12, Snowden officially retained him as his legal representative in Moscow. In explaining the relationship, Kucherena said, “Officially, he is my client, but at the same time, I provide a number of other services to him.” According to Kucherena, Snowden turned down
| | Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.z.indd 167 ® 9/29/16 5:51 Pa | |
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019655