BREAKING DOWN DEMOCRACY: Goals, Strategies, and Methods of Modern Authoritarians
Furthermore, because the population now has greater access to foreign sources of news and entertain- ment, regimes must grapple with the complex task of monopolizing the political discourse in ways that are far more convincing and compelling than the robotic pronouncements that played such a crucial part in communism's loss of credibility.
As is the case with so much of modern authoritarian practice, Russia has taken the lead in developing strat- egies and methods of media domination. The system built under Vladimir Putin is defined by the following characteristics:
1. Control over the commanding heights of the media: Among Putin's first goals as president was securing domination of the most influential media—the national television stations. They had been controlled by various oligarchs, who used the outlets to promote their personal and political interests. While the resulting journalism was hardly objective and independent, Russian television and Russian media generally were no- table for their liveliness and diversity during the presidency of Boris Yeltsin. All did not sing out of the same hymnal, and most influential outlets reflected a variety of opinions about government policies, including the Kremlin's conduct of the war in Chechnya.
Putin moved quickly to change these conditions. He reorganized and exerted tighter political con- trol over state-owned television stations, brought others under indirect state control, and ensured that most of the remainder fell into the hands
of loyal businessmen. Likewise, a number of the countn/’s leading newspapers and journals were bought by cronies of the leadership. The era of media diversity came to an abrupt end.’
2. Distortion of coverage on sensitive topics: Un- like in communist times, the media do provide independent coverage of topics that the Kremlin considers less politically relevant. However, some normally apolitical topics can take ona highly political meaning. For example, coverage of the penalties meted out to Russian Olympic athletes for systematic doping reflected the leadership's position that the scandal was a product of American machinations.’
3. Shrinking gap between offline and online me- dia: For much of Putin's tenure, the internet
remained lightly regulated in comparison with the Kremlin's tight control over television and other mass media. However, Freedom House has noted growing restrictions over the past several years, with a series of new laws, prosecu- tions, and ownership changes that have reduced the Russian internet's freedom and diversity in practice.’
. Asmall stable of independent outlets: A token
number of media outlets are allowed to remain independent at the sufferance of the Kremlin. These include the newspaper Novaya Gazeta, the indirectly state-owned radio station Ekho Moskvy, and a handful of internet-based news services, some of which are forced to operate from neighboring countries. Coerced owner- ship changes and other forms of pressure have gradually reduced the already tiny independent media sector in recent years. And the remaining independent outlets have little reach, small audi- ences, and at best modest impact on domestic politics.
. The ‘weaponization’ of information: While Putin
has used the press as a propaganda instrument throughout his political career, it was after his third term as president began in 2012 that the media were given a special, central role in de- monizing Putin's critics, preparing the Russian people for armed conflict in Ukraine and else- where, depicting Europe as morally corrupt, and attributing Russia's problems and setbacks to the United States.* With the invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the world awakened to the return of propaganda as an instrument of warfare. This is not just normal political spin or public diploma- cy, but sheer, raw propaganda that celiberately crosses the line between interpretation of facts and outright mendacity. The aim is both to stir up belligerence at home and to isolate, confuse, and demoralize the enemy.°
. The centralization of information policy: The
creation in 2013 of Rossiya Segodnya, an umbrel- la organization for Moscow's foreign news ser- vices, signaled the leadership's intention to use information in a more strategic way to advance the country’s international objectives. Dmitry Kiselyov, a controversial television presenter, was named to head the new entity.® He actually embraces his identity as the Kremlin's chief propagandist, arguing that “Western” concepts
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