before such a fork appears. This approach, too, has its logical problems. Boxing the largest economy in the world hardly seems sensible - and is likely not achievable. Anyhow, early attempts to do so have shown how little leverage the US has. When China announced plans to build an Asian Investment and Infrastructure Bank in 2014, the US opposed it and then watched as nearly all of Washington’s traditional allies raced to join.
At the same time, China’s policy towards the US has been hard to decipher for many: Is the country intent on amity or enmity? It’s clear enough that the American options presented to Beijing are unappetizing: Change or be contained. Messages by China in response have tickled the natural historical pessimism of American political leaders. China speaks of wanting a new kind of relations with America, of cultivating rich technological and financial ties, but the country at the same moment challenges easy assumptions about how foreign investment, educational or security cooperation might mesh together like gears of friendly progress. It’s hard to do business in the Mainland. The military grows with astonishing speed. Domestic habits of smash-mouth competition rattle at more sedate Western habits. Any element of China’s actions are explainable and even sensible when seen with sympathetic eyes — but the same exact facts can be stitched into a story that suggests constant damage to American interests. China’s position is, to be honest, a difficult one: The country is opaque to most foreigners, wrapped in habits and instincts that run along such different lines that even simple daily decisions - how to runa meeting, for example - can be a source of disagreement. Jn the west you prize diamonds for their clarity, Chinese will say, in China we prize jade because it is cloudy. There’s a charm in opacity; even a bit of sensible political magic at times. But China is moving out into the world very rapidly, now: Fast and dimly understood don’t fuse into easy trust.
In one sense, then, it’s possible to sense the tense, angry energy of an impending collision. Beijing and Washington are enacting the old historical pattern. Wrestling for years over small issues, never quite coming to grips, slowly pulling at each other until a final, fatal collapse. Germany and Great Britain, all over again. But: Connection changes the nature of an object. So much in our world looks different after connected dynamics are applied. Might connection change the nature of enmity? We are, after all, part of the same connected skein. We've concluded that America’s greatest threat is not China or Russia or terrorism - but the evolution of the network itself. That same topological evolution menaces Beijing too. If China is not our biggest enemy, if we are not theirs - what might be developed? Might the rat trap of history remain unsprung?
An American “China Policy” shouldn’t be regarded as some distinct initiative; rather it must be a part of a grand strategic program of Hard Gatekeeping. Our goal aim isn’t some shimmeringly perfect “China Policy” so much as it is to cultivate a grand strategic disposition that informs what we undertake in cyber, Russia, the Middle East, and China. Imagine we had a terrific “China policy” and a backfiring “Nuclear weapons policy”? Masterful grand strategy is marked by a comprehensive elegance. Metternich’s old construction, “A Concert of Nations” tells the story pretty well: A
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