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ing from the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. The court found it had subject matter jurisdiction over defendant Libya, a designated state sponsor of terror, pursuant to § 1605(a)(7) of the FSIA. Rew, 995 F.Supp. at 329-30. Noting that the FSIA provides for person- al jurisdiction as long as subject matter jurisdiction exists and proper service was effected, the court turned to Libya’s con- tacts with the United States. Jd. at 330 (citing Burger King, 471 US. at 472, 105 S.Ct. 2174). It found that Libya’s contacts with the United States were sufficient be- cause its allegedly “intentional, tortious ac- tions [were] ... ‘expressly aimed at’ the United States,” and included “destruction of a United States flag aircraft ... while en route to the United States ... with 189 United States nationals on board.” Jd. (citing Calder, 465 U.S. at 789, 104 S.Ct. 1482). The court concluded that its exer- cise of personal jurisdiction was appropri- ate since “[alny foreign state would know that the United States has substantial in- terests in protecting its flag carriers and its nationals from terrorist activities and should reasonably expect that if these in- terests were harmed, it would be subject to a variety of potential responses, includ- ing civil actions in the United States.” Jd.
Similarly, in Dalibertt the court found it had subject matter jurisdiction over defen- dant Iraq, a designated state sponsor of terror, in a case stemming from the al- leged torture of several United States citi- zens who were working in Kuwait. Dal- bertt, 97 F.Supp.2d at 46. Iraq argued that exercising personal jurisdiction over it would offend constitutional due process since the FSIA “abrogates the minimum contacts requirement.” Jd. at 52. The court disagreed and explained that “Con- eress expressly addressed the minimum contacts requirement in enacting the FSIA by providing that ‘[plersonal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every
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claim for relief over which the district courts have jurisdiction”” Jd. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 183000); Shapiro v. Republic of Bolivia, 930 F.2d 1018, 1020 (2d Cir.1991)). The court acknowledged that the foreign state’s contacts with the United States might be more attenuated in the context of the state sponsor of terrorism exception than in the FSIA’s other exceptions, but concluded “in the context of this statute, the purpose for which it was enacted, and the nature of the activity toward which it is directed, ... it is reasonable that for- eign states be held accountable in the courts of the United States for terrorist actions perpetrated against U.S. citizens anywhere.” Jd. at 54. Finally, it noted that the “detention of these three plaintiffs had a direct effect in the United States and was consciously designed to affect United States policy ... Iraq cannot now claim surprise at the assertion of jurisdic- tion by this Court.” Jd.
Most recently, in Pugh, representatives of passengers killed in the bombing of a French airliner in Africa survived a motion to dismiss by the individual defendants. The court found it had subject matter ju- risdiction over seven Libyan officials, in- cluding Muammar Qadhafi, pursuant to the state sponsor of terrorism exception of the FSIA outlined in § 1605(a)(7). Pugh, 290 F.Supp.2d at 58. In its personal juris- diction analysis, the court concluded that the individuals had sufficient contacts with the United States to satisfy due process since they had “conspired to sabotage” a flight, which was scheduled to “stop in several nations,” thus making it foresee- able that “passengers of many nationalities would be on board.” Jd. at 59. From their actions, the defendants could have expected to be haled into “the courts of those nations whose citizens would die.” Id. Given the number of passengers on the plane, it was also foreseeable that Ameri-
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