802
Prince Turki is also alleged to have at- tempted to protect Saudi Arabia from ter- rorism and to have implemented the King- dom’s foreign relations with the Taliban and Osama bin Laden. In determining whether these were discretionary func- tions, the Court must decide whether the actions involved an element of choice or judgment based on considerations of public policy. See Callahan v. United States, 329 F.Supp.2d 404, 408 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (inter- preting FTCA); Berkowitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536, 108 S.Ct. 1954, 100 L.Ed.2d 531 (1988) (construing FTCA).
[29,30] There can be little doubt that, as the chairman of the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs, charged with making rec- ommendations to the Council of Ministers regarding requests for aid from Islamic organizations located abroad, and as the head of the Special Committee of the Council of Ministers, charged with decid- ing which grants should be made to Islam- ic charities, Prince Sultan’s decisions were made at the planning level of government, Kline, 685 F.Supp. at 392, and “grounded in social, economic, and political policy,” Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814, 104 S.Ct. 2755. Similarly, as the head of DGI, Prince Turki’s decisions regarding the treatment of the Taliban and Osama bin Laden were judgments based on consider- ations of public policy. See Callahan v. United States, 329 F.Supp.2d at 408; see also Burnett If, 292 F.Supp.2d at 20-21 ({TJhis conclusion would be nearly self- evident: Prince Turki, as director of intel- ligence, taking acts to protect Saudi Arabia from terrorism, and Prince Sultan, as chairman of the Supreme Council, making recommendations to the Council of Minis- ters about requests for assistance from Islamic organizations outside Saudi Arabia or, as head of the Special Committee, de- ciding what disbursements should be made
29. The consolidated complaints are Ashton,
349 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES
to Islamic charitable organizations, were clearly making ‘decisions grounded in so- cial, economic, and political policy, ”) (quoting Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814, 104 S.Ct. 2755).
Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiffs allege acts Prince Sultan and Prince Turki performed in their official capacities, Prince Sultan’s and Prince Turki’s motions to dismiss the certain consolidated com- plaints and the Federal complaint are granted. The Court denies Plaintiffs’ re- quest for jurisdictional discovery because Plaintiffs have not presented any factual basis for believing that discovery might reasonably be expected to result in evi- dence that would overcome the discretion- ary function exception. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A) (exception not applicable to “any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function regard- less of whether the discretion be abused.”) The Court will consider the appropriate- ness of exercising personal jurisdiction over Prince Sultan’s and Prince Turki’s personal acts in Part II below.
b. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
There is no dispute that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a foreign state within the meaning of the FSIA. Federal Complaint 163. The Federal Plaintiffs have the “burden of going forward with evidence that, under exceptions to the FSIA, immu- nity should not be pranted.” Virtual Countries, 300 F.3d at 241 Gnternal quota- tions omitted). As explained above, the only possible applicable exception is the torts exception under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5).
[31,32] The Federal Plaintiffs’ allega- tions arise “predominantly from miscon-
Barrera, Burnett, Salvo, and Tremksy.
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