20 2 What Is Human-Like General Intelligence?
[Goel0c]. A general intelligence is then understood as one that can do this for a variety of complex goals in a variety of complex environments.
However, apart from positing definitions, it is difficult to say anything nontrivial about gen- eral intelligence in general. Marcus Hutter [Hut05] has demonstrated, using a characterization of general intelligence similar to the one above, that a very simple algorithm called AIXI” can demonstrate arbitrarily high levels of general intelligence, if given sufficiently immense com- putational resources. This is interesting because it shows that (if we assume the universe can effectively be modeled as a computational system) general intelligence is basically a problem of computational efficiency. The particular structures and dynamics that characterize real-world general intelligences like humans arise because of the need to achieve reasonable levels of intel- ligence using modest space and time resources.
The “patternist” theory of mind presented in [GoeQ6a] and briefly summarized in Chap- ter 3 below presents a number of emergent structures and dynamics that are hypothesized to characterize pragmatic general intelligence, including such things as system-wide hierarchical and heterarchical knowledge networks, and a dynamic and self-maintaining selfmodel. Much of the thinking underlying CogPrime has centered on how to make multiple learning components combine to give rise to these emergent structures and dynamics.
2.1.2 What Is Human-like General Intelligence?
General principles like “complex goals in complex environments” and patternism are not suf- ficient to specify the nature of human-like general intelligence. Due to the harsh reality of computational resource restrictions, real-world general intelligences are necessarily biased to particular classes of environments. Human intelligence is biased toward the physical, social and linguistic environments in which humanity evolved, and if AI systems are to possess humanlike general intelligence they must to some extent share these biases.
But what are these biases, specifically? This is a large and complex question, which we seek to answer in a theoretically grounded way in Chapter 9. However, before turning to abstract theory, one may also approach the question in a pragmatic way, by looking at the categories of things that humans do to manifest their particular variety of general intelligence. This is the task of the following section.
2.2 Commonly Recognized Aspects of Human-like Intelligence
It would be nice if we could give some sort of “standard model of human intelligence” in this chapter, to set the context for our approach to artificial general intelligence — but the truth is that there isn’t any. What the cognitive science field has produced so far is better described as: a broad set of principles and platitudes, plus a long, loosely-organized list of ideas and results. Chapter 5 below constitutes an attempt to present an integrative architecture diagram for human-like general intelligence, synthesizing the ideas of a number of different AGI and cognitive theorists. However, though the diagram given there attempts to be inclusive, it nonetheless contains many features that are accepted by only a plurality of the research community.
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