some way. Then they decided whether the person should be praised for a particular moral act such as returning a wallet, considered responsible for an immoral act such as breaking a promise, helped out for mistreatment such as being pushed out of line by a person in a hurry, and punished or rehabilitated for wrongful behavior.
Haslam’s results generated a landscape of humanness very much like Gray and Wegner’s. Those groups rated highly in terms of agency, were more likely to be blamed and punished. Those groups rated high in experience were more likely to be praised, protected, and placed into rehabilitation. Those groups perceived as more emotional, compassionate and warm — components of experience — were praised more, whereas those perceived as more civil and rational — components of agency — were praised less. Overall, the more a group tilts toward the experience end of the spectrum, the more we see them as moral patients, deserving of our care and compassion. The more a group tilts toward the agency end of the spectrum, the more we see them as moral agents, having responsibilities and duties to act morally.
Haslam’s findings are not only of great conceptual interest, shaping our understanding of the defining qualities of being human, but also figure into everyday political and legal decision making. When do we believe a person has the right to vote, drive responsibly, drink alcohol reasonably, and serve an adult as opposed to a youth sentence for a crime? In the United States, the age cut off for considering the punishment of a crime under the jurisdiction of a juvenile court proceeding ranges from 16-19 years. Juvenile sentences are lighter than adult sentences, and rarely include life in prison or the death penalty. Though there is an arbitrariness to these age cut offs, and no good reason why states should differ, the decision to treat youths differently not only maps on to our intuitions but to the attributes that psychologists such as Haslam, Gray and Wegner have discovered. Treating an individual as a youth is more likely to trigger the dimension of experience in jury members and thus, more likely to trigger a sense that the individual should be protected and given the opportunity to change through rehabilitation. This fits with scientific evidence that an immature brain is a more plastic brain, capable of change. It also fits with the evidence that an immature brain is a brain with less self-control and critical reasoning — both components of the agency dimension. These less than fully human qualities on the agency dimension, balanced by more qualities on the experience dimension, provide youths with an automatic entry ticket into the arena of moral patients.
Moving outside of the arena of moral patienthood and into that of moral agency requires a change in perception. It requires us to see individuals as acting responsibly, controlling temptation, and understanding the distinction between right and wrong. It is for these reasons that our legal system, and the courts that carry out its principles, must consider psychological differences. Classifying individuals as adults or juveniles drags with it a massive psychology that is biased toward responsibility, blame and
punishment on the one hand and protection, intervention, and rehabilitation on the other. The same biases
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