then other factors enter into the calculation. This is where things get interesting as these other factors determine the start and end of a contest.
Insights into the dynamics of aggressive competition emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s due to two fundamental developments within evolutionary biology. The first involved a marriage between economic game theory and evolutionary biology. This marriage was set up by the British evolutionary biologist John Maynard Smith who recognized that for any competitive interaction, there are different strategies, each with different payoffs. Some strategies are more costly, but return greater benefits. Others are more conservative and less costly, but return smaller benefits. How well any given strategy does depends on its frequency in the population, and thus, on whether the particular strategy is dominant or rare. For example, consider a baboon troop with 20 adult males. Imagine that one of the males decides to bare his canines, stand up on his two hind legs, and charge whenever anyone comes near him and he is eating. This male is displaying his intent to attack at the slightest provocation. One could imagine that this would be very effective, especially if he is the only one displaying in this way. But if this display pattern spreads, and all 19 other males do the same thing, then this strategy fails as it no longer distinguishes among the 20 males in the troop. What evolutionary game theory tells us is that the effectiveness of a strategy depends on how common it is within the population. Power comes, in part, from being not too common or predictable.
The second development involved signaling theory, and a challenge to the traditional approach that considered animal signals as truthful messengers of information. On the traditional view, when a monkey bares his canines, he is signaling his motivation to attack. When a dog puts his tail between his legs, he is signaling his submissive status. When a bird gives an alarm call, she is telling others that a predator is nearby. When a human smiles, he is conveying his desire for friendship. The new signaling theory presented a challenge to this honest view of communication. Why, for example, wouldn’t individuals lie, deceiving others into believing that they were really tough, meek, in danger, or friendly, only to take advantage of the situation and gain added resources. Why, for example, wouldn’t a baboon who was actually afraid, put on a tough-guy show and scare off his opponents? Why wouldn’t a dog who was actually tough, send a submissive signal at the start of the interaction, cause his opponent to lower his guard, and then attack? Why wouldn’t a bird send an alarm in the absence of danger, knowing that others will run for cover and leave all the food behind — no competition? Why wouldn’t a human who actually wanted to lure in an innocent victim for robbery send a seductive smile? This line of questioning, developed by the British evolutionary biologists Richard Dawkins and John Krebs, led to a number of studies showing that animals are engaged in a much more complicated and dynamic dance when they compete. Static properties of the animal — its height, weight, tail length, antler size — indicate its raw,
unfakeable ability to fight or what biologists call Resource Holding Potential or RHP. A deer with a large
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