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HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011659

House Oversight Committee
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in the Sinai. Dan Shomron was now head of the southern command and had told me, before we headed back from California, that he’d recommended me for the post. It was an especially exciting prospect because the US-backed negotiations with Egypt did finally appear to be nearing an agreement. As commander of Division 252, I’d be coordinating and implementing Israel’s Sinai withdrawal.

But I didn’t get the job, at least not on my return. Raful Eitan had indeed succeeded Motta as chief of staff, and he had the final say. I'd evidently been right to assume I would figure no higher in his estimation than I had as sayeret commander. To be fair, however, he did agree to my becoming commander of Dan’s reserve division in the south: the same 611" that Arik Sharon had led across the canal in 1973. When I took up that post in April 1979 — just days after the formal Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty was indeed signed — I was also promoted. I became a one-star general. And eighteen months later, when the regular division post came open again, I did get the nod to command the 252™".

Even then, it was a close-run thing. Raful called me in to see him and said he wanted me to return to the kirya instead, in the one-star general’s post inside military intelligence. He said he had more than enough candidates for division commander, but that my previous experience meant I was the best choice for the intelligence post. I was determined to remain in the field, especially with signs that Begin, and certainly his more right-wing supports in the Likud, were already having second thoughts about the peace deal we’d struck with Egypt. In part, they feared that a withdrawal from any of the land taken in the 1967 war might create a precedent, and invite pressure, for more withdrawals. But the real buyers’ remorse centered on the fact that, as part of the initial agreement at Camp David, Begin had needed to accept a parallel framework for negotiations toward a broader peace that would include the West Bank and Gaza Palestinians.

In any case, with Raful balking a second time at giving me the division command, | figured I had little to lose by fightinhg my corner, and telling him exactly what I felt. “Look, I realize that you’re chief of staff,” I said. “But don’t forget we’re both just temporarily in whatever role we hold. I’m not here as a draftee. I’m in the army by choice. It’s your decision to tell me what position you want me to take. But you can’t impose anything. I can always leave. Or I can bide my time until you leave.” Raful apparently concluded he couldn’t actually force me to take the intelligence job. With Dan having made his preference clear, he didn’t press the point.

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